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Abstract
Do individuals divorce for economic reasons? Can we measure the attractiveness of new
matches in the marriage market? We answer these questions using a structural model of the
household and a rich panel dataset from Malawi. We propose a model of the household with
consumption, production and revealed preference conditions for stability on the marriage market.
We dene marital instability in terms of the consumption gains to remarrying another individual
in the same marriage market, and to being single. We nd that a 1 percentage point increase
in the wifes estimated consumption gains from remarriage is signicantly associated with a 0:6
percentage point increase in divorce probability in the next three years. In a multinomial model,
higher values of consumption gains from remarriage raise the odds of divorce and remarriage but
not of divorce and singleness. These ndings provide out-of-sample validation of the structural
model and shed new light on the economic determinants of divorce.
Keywords: marriage market, divorce, Malawi, agricultural production, revealed preference
JEL classication: D11, D12, D13, J12
1 Introduction
Becker (1973, 1974) convincingly argued that the institution of marriage can be analyzed by means
of modern microeconomic theory. In his ground-breaking work, as well as in subsequent work by
Becker, Landes and Michael (1977), the concept of the marriage market is introduced, which rests
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on the simple but powerful assumption that individuals are rational utility maximizers who compete
as they seek mates. Such a framework implies that each individual looks for the best mate subject
to the restrictions imposed by the marriage market. An important concept in this theory is gains
to marriage, which depend on the particular union as well as on the opportunities implied by the
marriage market as a whole.
The gains to marriage do not only consist of companionship and the production and rearing
of children. There are also considerable economic gains, such as the sharing of public goods or
the division of labour within unions (see Browning, Chiappori and Weiss, 2014, for an extensive
discussion). The economic gains to marriage play a crucial role in the recent model proposed by
Cherchye, Demuynck, De Rock and Vermeulen (2015) to analyze the impact of the marriage market
on the intrahousehold distribution of resources. In their model, the collective model (Chiappori,
1988, 1992) is combined with the assumption of a stable marriage market, a concept that is directly
related to the ideas in Becker (1973, 1974) and Becker, Landes and Michael (1977). The model
predicts that the more attractive the outside options of a spouse, the higher is his or her share of
the households resources. These outside options improve with ones productivity, which implies
that the marriage market can explain the widely observed positive relationship between wages and
the share of household resources consumed (see, e.g., Blundell, Chiappori, Magnac and Meghir,
2007, Cherchye, De Rock and Vermeulen, 2012, and Cherchye, De Rock, Lewbel and Vermeulen,
2015).
In this paper, we argue that the economic aspects of marriage and divorce may be even more
salient in developing countries. As a consequence, we focus on the estimation of the gains to
marriage and divorce in Malawi, which is one of the poorest countries in the world. Given the
importance of agricultural production in this setting, we extend the theoretical model in Cherchye,
Demuynck, De Rock and Vermulen (2015) to include production. Appealingly, we can do this while
allowing for both heterogeneous individual preferences and household production technologies. We
estimate this model on panel data drawn from the Malawi Integrated Household Survey (IHS),
and we test whether model-based measures of marital instability predict future divorces. As we
discuss in more detail in Section 3.1, Malawi is an attractive setting for the estimation of this model
because it has one of the highest divorce rates in Africa.1 Reniers (2003) shows that in Malawi
lifetime divorce probabilities are between 40% and 65%. He also shows that remarriage is almost
universal: within two years of divorce, over 40% of women have remarried in the sample, and this
gure reaches almost 90% after ten years. Thus, divorce and remarriage is a realistic outside option
for married individuals.
Our model yields two structural indices for marriage instability: the rst index captures how
much better o¤ (in consumption terms) the individual would be if single (the Individual Rationality
(IR) index), while the second index measures how much better o¤ the individual would be if (s)he
remarried another individual in the same marriage market (the Blocking Pair (BP) index). In the
1Moreover, Dunbar, Lewbel and Pendakur (2013) also used the collective model to study the consumption behav-
iour of Malawian households. These authors particularly focused on identifying resource shares of children. In the
current study, we follow a similar collective approach to analyze marriage stability.
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empirical analysis, we compute these instability indices for each married individual in the 2010
wave of our data. We then link these measures of instability to observed divorces between the 2010
and 2013 waves of the IHS. This sheds light on the importance of economic gains to marriage and
divorce and how well our model is able to predict divorces and subsequent remarriages.
Our empirical results demonstrate that the wifes BP index signicantly predicts divorce in the
panel. A one-percentage-point increase in the wifes BP index, as a proportion of her households
income, raises the probability of divorce by 0:6 percentage points on average. This is a non-
negligible e¤ect, as the proportions of currently divorced and married individuals in the population
suggest an annual divorce probability of 8:5%.2 Therefore, we nd that a model-based predictor
of divorce correlates with out-of-sample realizations of divorce, hence validating the structural
model. Interestingly, this signicant association cannot be explained by spouseswages, land income
or nonlabour income which, alongside intrahousehold sharing, are the key determinants of the
BP index in the structural model. This suggests that intrahousehold sharing e¤ectively plays
an important role in the gains to marriage and divorce. As an extension to these results, we also
estimate a multinomial model that di¤erentiates between individuals who divorce and remain single,
and those who divorce and remarry. Interestingly, we nd that the wifes BP index is signicantly
associated with the wife divorcing and remarrying, but not divorcing and remaining single. This is
consistent with the idea that the BP index captures the attractiveness of remarriage.
Our paper makes two contributions to the literature. First, from a methodological point of
view, it extends the model of Cherchye, Demuynck, De Rock and Vermeulen (2015) to account
for domestic production in modeling householdseconomic behavior. This is particularly relevant
for households in developing countries, for which agricultural production activities are prevalent.
Interestingly, this also allows us to estimate shadow wages and land prices, which are often missing
or su¤er from measurement error in empirical applications. A distinguishing feature of our method
is that it belongs to a revealed preference tradition that is free of any parametric assumptions, and
thus obtains robust conclusions. See Samuelson (1938), Afriat (1967), Diewert (1973) and Varian
(1982) for early contributions on revealed preference analysis of household consumption behavior.
More recently, Cherchye, De Rock and Vermeulen (2007, 2009, 2011) have extended this seminal
work towards the analysis of collective households.
Second, our empirical application o¤ers a novel perspective on the growing literature on the
economic drivers of divorce. This literature has focused on the relationship between economic
shocks and divorce. For example, Weiss and Willis (1997) nd that shocks to husbandsearning
capacity reduce the probability of divorce, while shocks to wivesearning capacity increase it. In
a similar vein, Boheim and Ermisch (2001) nd that positive economic surprises among British
households reduce the probability of union dissolution. Charles and Stephens (2004) compare the
e¤ect of spousal job loss and spousal disability, and nd that job loss raises the probability of divorce
but disability does not. Other papers examine the e¤ect of lottery winnings on divorce (Hankins
2Assuming individuals change from marriage to divorce states according to a Markov process, using the proportions
of individuals currently married and divorced in the IHS and using the remarriage probabilities in Reniers (2003),
implies an annual divorce probability of 8:5%.
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and Hoekstra, 2011) and the relationship between house prices and divorce (Farnham, Schmidt
and Sevak, 2011). An alternative way to model observed patterns of cohabitation, marriage and
divorce is proposed by Brien, Lillard and Stern (2006), who model match quality as an experience
good, à la Jovanovics (1979) labour market matching model. Overall, the evidence suggests that
there is an important economic component to divorce, although these studies do not consider
the potential for remarriage, and except for Brien, Lillard and Stern (2006), do not implement a
structural measure of the economic gains to divorce. As explained above, our structural approach
combines the collective consumption model with the assumption of marriage stability, which allows
us to explicitly incorporate the importance of intrahousehold sharing and options on the marriage
market in the analysis of marriage and divorce decisions.
The rest of this paper unfolds as follows. Section 2 introduces our revealed preference method-
ology for analysing stability of marriage. Here, we also dene our IR and BP indices for marriage
stability. In Section 3 we provide further motivation for our empirical research question by explain-
ing the specic setting of Malawi. We also present our sample of households and the construction of
the marriage markets used in our empirical application. Section 4 presents some summary statistics
on the main outcomes of our structural model. These results will motivate our regression analyses
in Section 5, in which we focus on the relationship between the economic gains to divorce (captured
by our IR and BP indices) and divorce and remarriage probabilities. Section 6 concludes. The
Appendix gives additional details on our data construction method.
2 Consumption, production and marriage stability
Our method for measuring instability of marriage builds on a recent paper by Cherchye, Demuynck,
De Rock and Vermeulen (2015). These authors dened a revealed preference characterization of
household consumption under stable marriage to analyze the intrahousehold allocation of resources.
A novel feature of our analysis is that we integrate agricultural production in this revealed preference
framework, thus linking productivity to marriage decisions. As we will explain further on (in Section
3.1), agricultural production is an important dimension of household decision behavior in Malawi.
It is the primary source of livelihood and a crucial determinant of outside options. Moreover, our
structural modeling of household production allows us to use shadow wages and land prices in our
analysis of marriage stability. This is particularly convenient in view of our empirical application,
because fully reliable wage and land price information is not available for the Malawian households
that we study. As this last feature is often characteristic to data sets on developing countries, this
also indicates the usefulness of our model in other application settings.
2.1 Notation and components of the structural model
We focus on the marriage stability of couples that consist of a female a and a male b. In what
follows, we will often refer to individual i = a; b. Let A be a nite set of females and B a nite set
of males. The marriage market is dened by a matching function  : A[B ! A[B. This function
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satises, for all a 2 A and b 2 B,
 (a) 2 B;  (b) 2 A;
 (a) = b 2 B if and only if  (b) = a 2 A:
In words, the function  assigns to every female or male a partner of the other gender (i.e.  (a) = b
and  (b) = a). In this methodological section we will assume that jAj = jBj, which means that
all individuals are matched. In contrast, in the empirical part of this paper we will account for
the possibility that jAj 6= jBj and that a married individual may consider remarrying a single of
the other gender. Actually, if we do not include rationalizability conditions for singlesbehavior,
it is relatively straightforward to formally include this possibility in the models below.3 However,
unless there is a shortage on one side of the marriage market, rationalizing the behavior of singles
requires an explicit model for frictions on the marriage market and/or marriage costs. To focus our
discussion, we abstract from such extensions in the current study.
Each individual i is assumed to spend her or his total time endowment (denoted by T i 2 R+) on
leisure (li 2 R+), market work (mi 2 R+) and agricultural work on the households land (denoted
by hi 2 R+). The individual time budget constraint thus equals:
T i = mi + hi + li:
The price of time is individual is wage, which we represent by wi 2 R++:
To model agricultural production, we assume that there are three types of inputs: the individ-
ualstime spent on agricultural labour (ha and hb), land (L 2 R+) and other input (x 2 R+; e.g.
fertilizer). We distinguish between land of the female (La 2 R+), land of the male (Lb 2 R+) and
joint householdland (L(a;b) 2 R+), i.e.
L = La + Lb + L(a;b):
For a given match (a; b), we assume a common price for the three land types, i.e. the price of La,
Lb and L(a;b) is given by z(a;b) 2 R++. Other input x is assumed to be a Hicksian aggregate with a
price that is normalized to unity. The inputs are transformed into an output y 2 R+ by means of
an agricultural production function F
 
ha; h(a); L; x

. We assume that this function is increasing
in its arguments and characterized by constant returns to scale (in line with Pollak and Wachter,
1975). The output associated with agricultural production is again a Hicksian aggregate, with a
price that is normalized at unity. The household is further associated with a nonlabour income
n(a;b) 2 R+.
The total income of a household consists of income from market work, agricultural production
and nonlabour income. It is allocated to a Hicksian aggregate good with a price that is normalized
3Specically, some of the variables in Propositions 1 and 2 (individual quantities, personalized prices, share of
non-labour income and shadow wages) must be set equal to zero in the case of singles. But the basic structure of the
rationalizability conditions in the propositions remains intact.
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to unity. This Hicksian aggregate is used for the private consumption of both spouses (denoted
by qa and qb 2 R+) and the households expenditures on a public good (denoted by Q 2 R+).
Examples of private goods are expenditures on food and clothing, while an example of a public
good is expenditure on children.
Finally, each individual i is assumed to derive utility from leisure, private consumption as
well as public consumption. The preferences of individual i are represented by a utility function
U i
 
li,qi; Q

that is assumed to be continuous, concave and strictly increasing in leisure li and
private consumption qi, and increasing in public consumption Q.
2.2 Marriage stability: theoretical characterization
Let us now dene a stable marriage allocation. We will say that an allocation is stable if it satises
three equilibrium conditions.
First, at the consumption level, we adopt the collective approach of Chiappori (1988, 1992)
and assume that within-household allocations are Pareto e¢ cient. Formally, this means that every
matched couple (a;  (a)) chooses a consumption allocation that solves
max
la;l(a);qa;q(a);Q
Ua (la; qa; Q) + U
(a)

l(a); q(a); Q

(1)
s.t.
wala + w(a)l(a) + qa + q(a) +Q  N + waT a + w(a)T (a);
where  represents the Pareto weight of male  (a) relative to female a, and N = n+ x+ zL. We
note that the Pareto weights are in general not constant. They will vary with factors such as wages.
Next, we remark that N contains nonlabour income n as well as the rental value of land (quantities
La, Lb and L(a;b), which are evaluated at the prices z(a;b) for each match (a; b)) and the cost for
the other input x. In terms of the households budget equation in (1), note that the total private
consumption on the left-hand side of the budget equation contains both market consumption and
agricultural output. Therefore we need to add the cost needed to produce this output to the right-
hand side as well. These expenditures are, of course, equal to the expenses on the inputs needed to
produce the specic output. The optimal composition of the inputs and the size of the agricultural
output is determined next.
Second, at the production level, we follow the set-up of Chiappori (1997) and assume that each
household (a;  (a)) is a prot maximizer, i.e. the chosen output-input combination solves
max
ha;h(a);L;x
y   waha   w(a)h(a)   zL  x (2)
s.t.
y = F

ha; h(a); L; x

:
Third, we assume that the marriage market is stable. Using the denition of Gale and Shapley
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(1962), marriage stability imposes that marriage matchings satisfy the conditions of Individual
Rationality and No Blocking Pair. To formalize the notion of Individual Rationality, we let UaH and
U bH represent female as and male bs utility in their given marriage. Then, Individual Rationality
requires
UaH  UaS and U bH  U bS ; (3)
where UaS and U
b
S denote the females and males maximum attainable utilities as singles, respec-
tively. Intuitively, Individual Rationality imposes that no female or male wants to exit the marriage
and become single.
Next, to formalize the condition of No Blocking Pair, we let UaP(a;b) and U
b
P(a;b)
represent any
possible realization of utilities for female a and male b if they formed a pair. Then, the No Blocking
Pair requirement imposes that
U iP(a;b) > U
i
H implies U
i0
H > U
i0
P(a;b)
for i; i0 2 fa; bg; i 6= i0: (4)
In words, a marriage allocation has no blocking pairs if no female a and male b are both better o¤,
with at least one individual strictly better o¤, by remarrying each other instead of staying with
their current partner.
In what follows, we will quantify deviations from the Individual Rationality and No Blocking
Pair conditions by Individual Rationality (IR) and Blocking Pair (BP) indices, which measure the
degree of marriage instability. We will compute these indices under the maintained assumptions
that intrahousehold consumption allocations are Pareto e¢ cient and production allocations are
prot e¢ cient.
2.3 Marriage stability: empirical conditions
For a given marriage market, the data set D contains the following information:
 matching function ,
 time uses li, mi and hi (and time endowment T i) of each individual i,
 wage wi of each individual i,
 consumption quantities (q(a;(a)); Q(a;(a))) of every matched couple (a; (a)),
 land quantities La, L(a) and L(a;(a)) of every matched couple (a; (a)),
 land price z(a;(a)) of every matched couple (a; (a)),
 input quantity x(a;(a)) of every matched couple (a; (a)),
 output quantity y(a;(a)) of every matched couple (a; (a)),
 nonlabour income n(a;(a)) of every matched couple (a; (a)).
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As is standardly assumed for household data, we remark that the set D does not include
information on individualsprivate consumption; only the aggregate household quantities q(a;(a))
are observed. The individuals private quantities will be treated as unknowns in our empirical
conditions for marriage stability.4 Next, in what follows we will assume that wages and land prices
remain the same when individuals exit marriage (and become single or remarry), i.e. divorce has
no productivity e¤ects. For the moment, we assume that these prices and wages are perfectly
observed. We will relax this assumption later on (see Section 2.4).
Characterizing stable marriage As explained in Section 2.2, we say that the data set D is
consistent with a stable matching if it allows the specication of individual utility functions Ua
and U b that represent the observed consumption behavior as Pareto e¢ cient and the observed
marriages as stable. We use revealed preference conditions that are intrinsically nonparametric, in
the sense that they do not require an explicit (parametric) specication of the functions Ua and
U b: In particular, based on Cherchye, Demuynck, De Rock and Vermeulen (2015, Proposition 2),
we obtain the following characterization of a stable marriage matching.5
Proposition 1 The data set D is consistent with stable matching  only if there exist,
a. for each matched pair (a; (a)) (a 2 A), individual quantities q(a;(a))a ; q(a;(a))(a) 2 R+ and
nonlabour incomes Na; N(a) 2 R+ that satisfy
q(a;(a))a + q
(a;(a))
(a) = q
(a;(a));
Na +N(a) = n(a;(a)) + x(a;(a)) + z(a;(a))L(a;(a));
b. and, for each pair (a; b) (a 2 A, b 2 B), personalized prices P (a;b)a , P (a;b)b 2 R+ that satisfy
P (a;b)a + P
(a;b)
b = 1;
such that the following constraints are met:
i. individual rationality restrictions for all females a 2 A and males b 2 B, i.e.
Na + z(a;(a))La + waT a  wala + q(a;(a))a +Q(a;(a)), (5)
N b + z((b);b)Lb + wbT b  wblb + q((b);b)b +Q((b);b),
4 In our empirical application, part of the private consumption will be assignable to men and women (i.e. individual
expenditures on health, education and clothing; see the Appendix). Such information is easy to include in the linear
conditions in Proposition 1. Basically, it implies lower bound restrictions on the unknowns q(a;(a))a and q
(a;(a))
(a) . For
ease of notation, we will not explicitly consider this renement here.
5After suitably adapting the notation of Cherchye, Demuynck, De Rock and Vermeulen (2015), the proof of
Proposition 1 proceeds similarly as the proof of these authorsProposition 2. Given this analogy, and for compactness,
we do not explicitly include a formal proof in the current paper. Evidently, the proof can be obtained upon request.
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ii. no blocking pair restrictions for all a 2 A and b 2 B, i.e.
Na + z(a;(a))La + waT a

+

N b + z((b);b)Lb + wbT b

(6)


wala + wblb

+

q(a;(a))a + q
((b);b)
b

+

P (a;b)a Q
(a;(a)) + P
(a;b)
b Q
((b);b)

:
Thus, consistency of D with a stable matching requires that it is possible to specify individual
quantities q(a;(a))a ; q
(a;(a))
(a) and personalized prices P
(a;b)
a , P
(a;b)
b that satisfy a set of constraints that
are linear in these unknown quantities and prices. Therefore a convenient feature of the conditions
in Proposition 1 is that they can be checked through simple linear programming, which means that
they are easy to apply in practice. Also note that the observability of individual land constitutes
a natural lower bound in conditions (5) and (6).
We refer to Cherchye, Demuynck, De Rock and Vermeulen (2015) for a detailed explanation
of Proposition 1. Here, we highlight the revealed preference interpretation of the conditions (i)
and (ii) in terms of stable marriage allocation. First, the inequalities (5) in condition (i) require,
for each individual male and female, that the budget conditions under single status (with income
Na + z(a;(a))La + waT a for female a and N b + z((b);b)Lb + wbT b for male b) do not allow buying
a bundle that is strictly more expensive than the one consumed under the current marriage (i.e.
la; q
(a;(a))
a ; Q(a;(a))

for female a and

lb; q
((b);b)
b ; Q
((b);b)

for male b). Indeed, if this condition
is not met, then at least one man or woman is better o¤ (i.e. can attain a strictly better bundle)
as a single, which means that the marriage allocation is not stable.
In a similar vein, the right hand side of the inequality (6) in condition (ii) gives the sum value
of the bundles within marriage for female a (i.e. wala+ q(a;(a))a + P
(a;b)
a Q(a;(a))) and male b (i.e.
wblb + q
((b);b)
b + P
(a;b)
b Q
((b);b)), evaluated at the prices that pertain to the pair (a; b) (and using
the personalized prices P (a;b)a and P
(a;b)
b to evaluate the public quantities). The inequality then
requires that the pairs total income (i.e. Na + z(a;(a))La +waT a +N b + z((b);b)Lb +wbT b) must
not exceed this sum value. Intuitively, if this condition is not met, then woman a and man b can
allocate their income so that both of them are better o¤ (with at least one strictly better o¤) than
with their current matches (a) and (b), which makes (a; b) a blocking pair.
Quantifying marriage instability An important focus of our empirical analysis will be on
marriage instability. As explained before, we quantify marital instability in terms of individuals
consumption gains from divorcing and remaining single or remarrying. More specically, we use
our model to dene two structural measures of instability: our Individual Rationality (IR) indices
capture how much better o¤ (in consumption terms) individuals would be as a single person, and
our Blocking Pair (BP) indices measure how much better o¤ individuals would be when remarrying
other partners in the same marriage market.
To operationalize these ideas, for each exit option from marriage (i.e. become single or remarry
another potential partner), we quantify the minimal within-marriage consumption increase that
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is needed to represent the observed marriage as stable with respect to the given exit option (as
characterized by the conditions (i) and (ii) in Proposition 1). This indicates how far the observed
behavior (with the original income levels) is from stable behavior. Conversely, it measures the
possible gain from divorce when choosing a particular exit option and, therefore, we can interpret
it as revealing the degree of marriage instability.
Formally, starting from our characterization in Proposition 1, we include an instability index
in each restriction of individual rationality (sIRa;; for the female a and s
IR
;;b for the male b) and no
blocking pair (sBPa;b for the pair (a; b)). We replace the inequalities in (5) by
Na + z(a;(a))La + waT a

  sIRa;;  wala + q(a;(a))a +Q(a;(a)), (7)
N b + z((b);b)Lb + wbT b

  sIR;;b  wblb + q((b);b)b +Q((b);b),
and the inequality (6) by
Na + z(a;(a))La + waT a

+

N b + z((b);b)Lb + wbT b

  sBPa;b (8)


wala + wblb

+

q(a;(a))a + q
((b);b)
b

+

P (a;b)a Q
(a;(a)) + P
(a;b)
b Q
((b);b)

,
and we add the restriction 0  sIRa;;; sIR;;b ; sBPa;b . The indices sIRa;;, sIR;;b and sBPa;b represent individuals
consumption gains when choosing particular exit options from marriage: sIRa;; when female a
becomes single, sIR;;b when male b becomes single, and s
BP
a;b when a and b remarry with each other.
Clearly, imposing sIRa;;; s
IR
;;b ; s
BP
a;b = 0 obtains the original (sharp) conditions in Proposition 1, while
higher values for sIRa;;, s
IR
;;b and s
BP
a;b correspond to larger deviations from stable marriage behavior.
In our application, we measure the degree of instability of our data set by computing
min
sIR
a;;;s
IR
;;b;s
NBP
a;b
X
a
sIRa;; +
X
b
sIR;;b +
X
a
X
b
sBPa;b ; (9)
subject to the feasibility constraints (a) and (b) in Proposition 1 and the linear constraints (7) and
(8). By solving (9), we compute IR indices for the individual rationality constraints (sIRa;; and s
IR
;;b
in (7)) and BP indices for the no blocking pair constraints (sBPm;w in (8)). Correspondingly, for
each exit option, we can dene an associated gain from divorce. In our application, we will dene
relativedivorce gains by setting out these gains as proportions of the households income:
2.4 Shadow wages and land prices
So far we have assumed that prices are observed. If prices are not observed, we can use shadow
prices. To do so, we can use the structural model that we dened in Section 2.2, which assumes
prot e¢ cient behavior under constant returns to scale (see (2)). In the spirit of Proposition 1, we
use a characterization of prot e¢ ciency that is nonparametric, which here means that it does not
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require an explicit specication of the production technology (represented by the function F ).6
Let the true wages (wi for each individual i = a; b) and land prices (z(a;(a)) for each matched
pair (a; (a))) be unobserved. Then, we can dene shadow wages and prices under the identifying
assumption of prot e¢ cient production behavior. Specically, we say that the data set D is
consistent with shadow prot maximization if we can specify a production function F such that
prot e¢ ciency of the observed production behavior is supported by shadow prices. Adapting the
notation in Varian (1984, Theorem 6) to our setting, we obtain the following characterization of
productive e¢ cient behavior.
Proposition 2 The data set D is consistent with shadow prot maximization if and only if,
for each matched pair (a; (a)) (a 2 A), there exist shadow wages wa; w(a) 2 R+ and a land price
z(a;(a)) 2 R+ that satisfy
0 = y(a;(a))  (10)h
waha + w(a)h(a) + z(a;(a))

La + L(a) + L(a;(a))

+ x(a;(a))
i
such that, for all a0 2 A,
0  y(a0;(a0))  (11)h
waha
0
+ w(a)h(a
0) + z(a;(a))

La
0
+ L(a
0) + L(a
0;(a0))

+ x(a
0;(a0))
i
:
Basically, the conditions (10) and (11) require that there exist shadow prices such that the
observed input-output combination of each matched pair (a; (a)) achieves a prot of zero (see
(10)), which must exceed the prot for any household (a0; (a0)) (with a0 2 A) under the same
prices (see (11)): This condition of zero maximum prot directly follows from our constant returns
to scale assumption. We append these prot e¢ ciency restrictions to the stability conditions above.
As a result, our marriage stability analysis will use shadow wages and land prices that are identied
under the assumption of e¢ cient household production. See also the linear program that we present
below (in (14)).
Our empirical analysis will make use of two extensions of the characterization in Proposition
2. First, the characterization only imposes that shadow prices should be non-negative. Obviously,
this allows for shadow prices that are unrealistic proxies of the true (unobserved) prices (e.g. prices
that are innitely high). To exclude such unrealistic scenarios, we impose lower and upper bounds
on possible prices. Specically, we append the restrictions
wa  wa  wa, wb  wb  wb and z(a;(a))  z(a;(a))  z(a;(a));
for wa, wb, z(a;(a)) 2 R++ and wa, wb, z(a;(a)) 2 R++ predened lower and upper bounds. The
Appendix explains how we dene these bounds in our empirical application.
6See, for example, Afriat (1972) and Varian (1984) for seminal contributions on this nonparametric approach to
analyzing e¢ cient production behaviour.
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Our second extension pertains to the fact that the characterization in Proposition 2 implic-
itly assumes that di¤erent households are characterized by homogeneous production technologies.
Clearly, in practice we need to account for unobserved technological heterogeneity across house-
holds, i.e. some households have access to less e¢ cient production technologies than others. To
account for this heterogeneity, we introduce deviational variables a+, a , a;a0 2 R+ for each
matched pair (a;  (a)). These variables capture possible deviations from the original (sharp) con-
ditions in Proposition 2, which can thus be explained by heterogeneous technologies characterizing
the di¤erent production processes.7
Formally, in our prot e¢ ciency characterization in Proposition 2, we replace the equality
restriction (10) by
a+   a  = y(a;(a))  (12)h
waha + w(a)h(a) + z(a;(a))

La + L(a) + L(a;(a))

+ x(a;(a))
i
;
and the inequality restriction (11) by
a;a
0  y(a0;(a0))  (13)h
waha
0
+ w(a)h(a
0) + z(a;(a))

La
0
+ L(a
0) + L(a
0;(a0))

+ x(a
0;(a0))
i
:
Basically, the variables a+, a , a;a0 account for deviations from the zero maximum prot that
appears at the left hand side in the original conditions (10) and (11), i.e. they capture deviations
from the assumption of productive e¢ ciency under constant returns to scale with homogeneous
household technologies.
In our application, we use shadow prices that minimize the aggregate value of the deviational
variables,
P
a

a+ + a  +
P
a0 
a;a0

. In combination with the objective (9) dened above, this
obtains (with 0    1)
min
sIR
a;;;s
IR
;;b;s
NBP
a;b ;
a+;a ;a;a0

 X
a
sIRa;; +
X
b
sIR;;b +
X
a
X
b
sBPa;b
!
(14)
+(1  )
 X
a
 
a+ + a  +
X
a0
a;a
0
!!
;
subject to the constraints (a) and (b) in Proposition 1, the stability constraints (7) and (8) and the
prot e¢ ciency constraints (12) and (13). Because all constraints are linear in unknowns, we can
compute the solution values of sIRa;;, s
IR
;;b , s
BP
a;b , 
a+, a  and a;a0 by simple linear programming.
In (14), the parameter  is a tuning parameter that represents the penalizationweight of
the marriage instability indices relative to the technological heterogeneity variables. As we use
prot e¢ ciency as our identifying assumption for the shadow wages and land prices, we set  very
7Deviational variables are also used in the goal programmingapproach to deal with infeasible linear programs.
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small. This can be interpreted in terms of a two-stage optimization process: in the rst stage, we
dene shadow prices as the prices that correspond to minimal deviations from our prot ine¢ ciency
conditions (measured by
P
a

a+ + a  +
P
a0 
a;a0

); in the second stage, we compute instability
indices for the given shadow prices (by minimizing
P
a s
IR
a;;+
P
b s
IR
;;b+
P
a
P
b s
BP
a;b ).
3 Malawian households: setting, data and marriage markets
We start by sketching the specic context of Malawi. This will show that this country provides
an interesting setting to investigate our question regarding the impact of economic determinants
on marriage and divorce decisions. In a following step, we discuss our data selection and the
construction of householdsmarriage markets.
3.1 The Malawi setting
Malawi is a poor country in Sub-Saharan Africa. The GDP per capita was $226 in 2013 (World
Bank). It ranks 174th out of 187 countries on the 2014 Human Development Index, with a life
expectancy of 55.3 years at birth. This is partly due to the prevalence of HIV, which is one of the
highest in the world at 10% in 2014 (World Bank). Malawi ranked 129th out of 140 countries on the
Gender Inequality Index, which measures inequality along three dimensions: reproductive health,
empowerment and economic activity. It does better than surrounding countries partly because of
the high proportion of female seats in parliament and the high female labour force participation
rate. However, the proportion of females with secondary school education is low, at 10.4%.
According to Bignami-Van Assche et al (2011), around 90% of all employees work in the agri-
cultural sector. Most of these are involved in smallholder production with land plots in the range
of 0.2-3 hectares (Ellis, Kutengule and Nyasulu, 2003). The predominant crop grown is maize, and
agricultural production involves the joint labour supply of husbands and wives (Telalagic, 2015a).
Individualskey assets and thus outside options, here dened as utility on divorce, are their land-
holdings and capacity for labour supply. Land is largely passed on through inheritance, often at
the time of marriage (Telalagic, 2015b). All this makes it clearly plausible that spouses divorce for
economic reasons.
There are two key reasons why we choose this context to examine the role of economic factors in
divorce. First, Malawi is characterized by high divorce rates. Marriage is almost universal (Reniers,
2003), with over 99% of women and 97% of men having married at least once by the age of 30
(Demographic Health Survey Report, 2004). Early marriage is common, with the median age of rst
marriage at 18 for women and 23 for men (DHS Report, 2004); however, marriage is also unstable,
with almost half of all marriages ending within twenty years, a much higher gure than in other
African countries (Reniers, 2003). Women are more likely to be divorced, separated or widowed
than men (DHS Report, 2004), and marriage may be terminated either through a court decree or
by the death of a spouse. This decree is relatively easy to obtain, as the spouse seeking divorce
need only show that there is no love remaining in the marriage (Mwambene, 2005). Remarriage
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is also common, with 40% of women remarrying within two years. Thus, Malawi is characterized
by an ease of moving between marriage and divorce, and thus a high turnover of divorces and
remarriages, making it an appropriate setting for the model presented in Section 2, which assumes
no frictions on the marriage market and remarriage or being single as realistic outside options.
Second, marriage is local. Approximately 45% of married individuals are from the village they
live in, while a further 25% are from another village within the same district (Malawi IHS 2010,
authors calculations). This allows us to be precise about dening the marriage markets within
which divorced individuals can look for potential remarriage partners.
3.2 Household data and marriage markets
Our data are drawn from the third Malawi Integrated Household Survey (IHS). We use the base-
line survey conducted in 2010 and the second wave in 2013, where approximately one quarter of
households were re-interviewed. These households were chosen randomly, and both the baseline
sample and the panel subsample were designed to be nationally representative of the population of
Malawi. In the baseline survey, 768 communities were selected based on probability proportional
to size, and within those 16 households were randomly sampled. The sample we use is restricted
to rural households who report that they engage in agriculture.8 We only include monogamous
households where at least one spouse reports non-zero hours of agricultural labour in the past
year. This produces a sample of 8624 married and single households. As explained above, we allow
singles to form potential blocking pairs with married individuals. We obtain instability indices for
5924 married households, of which we observe 1404 households in the second wave. The Appendix
discusses in more detail how the data for the estimation and empirical analysis were constructed.
A crucial component of our analysis is the denition of the marriage market, within which
individuals can form potential blocking pairs. In Malawi, marriages tend to be local. In the IHS
data set, approximately 45% of married individuals are from the village they live in, while a further
25% are from another village within the same district. We use this fact to guide our denition
of the marriage market. In particular, we use the GPS coordinates provided in the IHS data to
construct clusters of two to three geographically close villages. We use the k-means algorithm in
Matlab, which partitions the data into k clusters using the squared Euclidean distance. We set
the number of clusters to 300, so that the number of households per cluster ranges from 5 to 58,
with the average number of households per cluster at 33.5. The more individuals there are in the
marriage market, the more likely that there is a protable new match. Thus, the size of the cluster
can a¤ect the values of instability. As a result, we control for the size of the cluster in our main
analysis of divorce.
Table 1 describes the average age, education, number of children and consumption character-
istics of our sample. We nd that, on average, the household head is middle-aged and 76% of
8We use the survey weights provided in all our descriptive statistics and empirical analyses, and also take into
account the fact that the primary sampling units are communities, so that clustering is at the community level, and
that we are selecting a subpopulation from the original sample.
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household heads have no education (education is measured by dummy variables equal to one if the
household heads highest education is of that level, and zero otherwise). The average household has
approximately three children and almost two acres of land. Most consumption is non-assignable,
with 23% of consumption devoted to public goods and 2% devoted to the mans and womans
assignable goods, on average.
4 Outcomes of the structural model
Table 2 summarizes some of the outputs of our structural model. We nd that, on average, women
have a signicantly lower shadow wage than men, which is consistent with observed wages in Malawi.
Women also have approximately one half of the land income of men, on average, which is partly
driven by the fact that the average woman owns less land than the average man. However, women
have signicantly higher non-labour income than men. In our model, non-labour income captures
the di¤erence between consumption and agricultural income. High non-labour income is driven by
low agricultural production, which in turn is driven by high hours of leisure in the sample. The high
levels of non-labour income suggest under-reporting of agricultural labour. Although this leads to
an underestimate of potential labour income on divorce, this underestimation is compensated for
in non-labour income, so that the total potential incomes of spouses are not systematically a¤ected
by the under-reporting of agricultural labour.
Next, we describe the features of marriage instability in our sample. For each individual, we
dene two Blocking Pair (BP) indices: the BPmax index represents the individuals gain associated
with the most attractive remarriage option, and the BPavg index gives the individuals average
gain from remarriage. Both indices are expressed as a percentage of the households total income.
Similarly, we also express the Individual Rationality (IR) indices as a percentage of the households
total income. Table 3 presents the summary statistics of these variables. Some interesting observa-
tions emerge. First, the estimated instability from potential blocking pairs shows that about 65%
of women have a protable match in their marriage market, while fewer than 17% of men have a
protable match. On the other hand, no woman in our sample would prefer to become single above
staying married, while over 47% of men would do so. From the BPmax results, we learn that, on
average, women gain more by choosing the most attractive remarriage option than men. However,
our BPavg results reveal that womens gains from selecting the average remarriage possibility
are generally lower than mens gains. These results suggest that women have many unattractive
potential matches and some very attractive potential matches, while men have mostly mediocre,
somewhat attractive potential matches.
There are two ways of interpreting these ndings. First, one can assume that the marriage
market is frictionless, in the sense that any protable opportunities are exploited. The model
predicts that almost half of the men in our sample would like to be single and more than half of
women have protable remarriage opportunities. However, given that the market is frictionless, the
model must be omitting unobserved costs of being single for men and remarriage for women. For
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Table 1: Age, education and other characteristics of households in the sample
Variable Mean
Age of head 40:39
(0:22)
Head has no education 0:76
Head has primary education 0:10
Head has secondary education 0:12
Head has tertiary education 0:01
Number of children 2:95
(0:03)
Land (acres) 1:94
(0:04)
Total consumption (000s) 210:70
(3:55)
Public share of consumption 0:23
(0:00)
Private share of consumption, woman 0:01
(0:00)
Private share of consumption, man 0:01
(0:00)
Nonassignable share of consumption 0:75
(0:00)
Number of observations 5924
Number of marriage markets 300
This table reports means and standard errors (between parentheses).
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Table 2: Outputs of the structural model
Men Women
Wage 124:09 117:32
(0:878) (0:784)
Land income (000s) 9:001 4:110
(0:356) (0:166)
Non-labour income (000s) 137:82 206:30
(3:187) (2:771)
Number of observations 5924
This table reports means and standard errors (between parentheses).
Table 3: Summary statistics of instability
Men Women
Mean % Non-zero Mean % Non-zero
BPmax 0:716 16:85 3:432 64:89
(0:072) (0:171)
BPavg 0:253 16:85 0:128 64:89
(0:022) (0:007)
IR 1:914 47:42 0 0
(0:118) N=A
Number of observations 5924
This table reports means, standard errors (between parentheses) and %
of non-zeroes.
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men, there may be an unobserved benet to being married, such as the domestic labour of their
wives. For women, there may be an unobserved cost of divorcing and remarrying, such as social
stigma.
Second, one can assume that the marriage market has frictions and exploiting protable oppor-
tunities takes time. In this case, the model predicts that many men in our sample will divorce to
become single in the future, while many women will divorce and remarry. On the other hand, few
women will choose to divorce and remain single, while few men will divorce and remarry. This is
at odds with the prevalence of single-headed female households in Malawi. In what follows, we will
shed more light on which of these two explanations is more likely by examining in more detail the
changes in marital status between 2010 and 2013.
At this point, we note that the absence of domestic labour in the model and data can explain
the fact that no woman would prefer to be single. As virtually all domestic labour in Malawi is
carried out by women, domestic labour is currently included in leisure. This means that women
who engage in many hours of domestic work appear to have more leisure than they actually do.
As a result, their outside option of being single appears less attractive. If data on domestic labour
were available, this would reduce womens leisure and make it more likely that some of them would
prefer to be single.
Table 4 shows the proportion of households that divorce between the 2010 an 2013 waves of
the survey. While 1240 couples remain married, it is fair to say that the number of couples who
split in this three-year period is relatively large, at 11.7% of the sample. There are some divorced
households in 2013 where one of the spouses could not be re-interviewed; this is why the total
number of divorced men or women with known marital status is fewer than the total number of
divorced households. Of those women with known marital status in 2013, there is a fairly even
share of single women and remarried women. On the other hand, most men divorce and remarry,
with few remaining single. This is at odds with the assumption of frictions on the marriage market,
which would imply that more men should become single rather than remarry between the two
waves, and few women should divorce in order to be single.
Finally, Table 5 compares the characteristics of couples who divorce with those who do not. We
nd that both men and women who divorce have higher values of all instability indices in 2010,
which suggests that these instability indices are capturing the returns to divorce. We will present
a rigorous analysis of this relationship in Section 5.2. The table also shows that households who
divorce have signicantly lower total consumption, fewer children and less land. Among couples
who are still married, the household head is older, on average. This variable may be capturing
marital duration, suggesting that couples who have been together longer are less likely to divorce
(because they have weaker outside options, or because poor matches are dissolved early on).
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Table 4: Marital status in the panel
N (%) Married Divorced - remarried Divorced - single Total
Couples 1240 164 (11.7%) 1404
Women 1240 74 (5.4%) 64 (4.6%) 1378
Men 1240 84 (6.2%) 21 (1.6%) 1345
Table 5: Summary statistics by divorce status
Divorce Do not divorce
BPmax, woman 3:81 3:31
(0:49) (0:32)
BPmax, man 0:72 0:59
(0:29) (0:13)
IR, man 1:94 1:74
(0:40) (0:25)
Age of head 35:04 40:83
(1:44) (0:55)
Number of children 2:49 3:13
(0:16) (0:06)
Land (acres) 1:72 2:06
(0:16) (0:07)
Total consumption (000s) 203:29 237:04
(12:51) (9:44)
Number of observations 164 1240
Number of marriage markets 117
This table reports means and standard errors (between parentheses).
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5 Divorce and economic gains
We start by presenting some regression results that shed light on which variables are correlated
with our stability indices. Subsequently, we further analyze the relation between our indices and
observed divorces in our Malawian data set. We will conclude that our structural measures of
marital stability are signicantly related to observed divorces and remarriages. This indicates that
divorce in Malawi is driven, at least partly, by economic motivations. Our empirical ndings also
provide out-of-sample validation of our structural model.
5.1 What drives instability?
In the rst step of our empirical analysis, we examine how household characteristics can explain
instability, in particular the BPmax and BPavg indices of men and women. We explore the e¤ect
of characteristics such as the heads education level, the consumption quintile, landholdings and
the distance to the nearest road and urban area. The consumption quintiles are dummy variables
that equal one if the households per capita consumption is in that bracket, and zero otherwise;
for example, the fth quintile is a dummy variable equal to one if the households per capita
consumption is in the top 20% of the sample. As the dependent variables are censored below zero,
we perform tobit regressions. We present the marginal e¤ect of covariates at the means of these
covariates on the censored variable. Table 6 presents these results.
We nd that the more educated the household head, the lower are the wifes BP indices (i.e.
her remarriage possibilities are less attractive). On the other hand, a secondary school educated
household head leads to higher instability for the man, compared to no education. This pattern
can be explained by the fact that most household heads are male, so that a highly educated
man is a more attractive husband, both to his wife and to other women in the marriage market.
The results also show that wealthier households are more stable: this is captured by landholdings
and the consumption quintile. Women, in particular, appear to be more maritally stable when
their household owns more land, while being in the top consumption quintile has an especially
signicant stabilizing e¤ect, as compared to being in the bottom consumption quintile (the excluded
group). These results are consistent with the descriptive statistics in Table 5, where households
who divorce in the panel own less land and have lower consumption. Finally, we observe an e¤ect
of connectedness on stability: the closer households are to the nearest road, the more unstable
they are; this is true for both spouses. A one kilometer increase in the households distance to
the nearest road reduces the wifes BPmax (i.e. maximum consumption gain from remarriage as a
percentage of household income) by 0:06 percentage points and the husbands by 0:02 percentage
points. This may be because being more connected to other places makes it easier for spouses to
widen their marriage market.
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Table 6: Explaining variation in instability: Tobit marginal e¤ects
(1) (2) (3) (4)
BPmax (woman) BPavg (woman) BPmax (man) BPavg (man)
Head educ.: Primary -0.216 -0.011 0.094 0.051
(0.180) (0.007) (0.070) (0.038)
Head educ.: Secondary -0.470 -0.019 0.243 0.143
(0.170) (0.007) (0.080) (0.049)
Head educ.: Tertiary -1.672 -0.058 0.580 0.393
(0.490) (0.022) (0.565) (0.349)
2nd Quintile (per capita cons.) 0.061 0.002 -0.154 -0.085
(0.190) (0.008) (0.100) (0.058)
3rd Quintile -0.257 -0.009 -0.190 -0.110
(0.206) (0.010) (0.092) (0.051)
4th Quintile -0.166 -0.008 -0.330 -0.175
(0.217) (0.009) (0.092) (0.052)
5th Quintile -0.869 -0.035 -0.449 -0.247
(0.206) (0.009) (0.092) (0.053)
Land (acres) -0.106 -0.004 0.000 -0.003
(0.043) (0.002) (0.014) (0.008)
HH Distance to urban centre, km -0.004 -0.000 0.000 -0.000
(0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
HH Distance to road, km -0.061 -0.002 -0.016 -0.007
(0.023) (0.001) (0.005) (0.003)
Number of observations 5924 5924 5924 5924
This table reports the results of a tobit regression, with marginal e¤ects evaluated at the means of the covariates.
District xed e¤ects and age of household head in all regressions. * indicates signicance at the 10% level, ** at the
5% level and *** at the 1% level.
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5.2 Divorce
We now present the main empirical analysis. We examine whether our instability indices, estimated
using 2010 data, can predict divorce in the following three years. We estimate a logit model of
divorce between 2010 and 2013, with the BP indices of the spouses and the IR index of the husband
as covariates. We do not include the wifes IR index because this measure does not not vary in
our sample. In addition to the covariates in the regressions in Table 6, we also include variables
to measure religiousness in the village (the number of churches and the number of mosques), an
additional measure of connectivity (access to a telephone in the village) and measures of match
quality (the education, age and religion di¤erence of the spouses). Finally, we also include the size
of the cluster as a control variable. The results are in Table 7.
Interestingly, we nd a signicant relationship between the instability indices from our structural
model and subsequent divorce. In regression (1), a one-percentage-point increase in the wifes
maximum gain from remarriage, as a proportion of her households income, raises the probability
of divorce by 0:6 percentage points on average. This is a non-negligible e¤ect, as the proportions of
currently divorced and married individuals in the population suggest an annual divorce probability
of approximately 8:5%. In regression (2), a one-percentage-point increase in the average remarriage
gain for the wife, as a proportion of her households income, raises divorce probability by 17:9
percentage points. Note that the impact of a percentage point change of the maximum and average
gains from remarriage on the divorce probability are not directly comparable to each other since
the base levels of the BPmax and BPavg are very di¤erent (see Table 3). The BPavg index of the
husband also has a positive, signicant e¤ect on divorce probability, although the e¤ect is small in
magnitude compared to that of the wifes BPavg index. Next, we nd that the IR index of the man
has a slightly negative, but statistically signicant, impact on divorce. This may seem surprising
at rst sight. However, as we will explain further on (when discussing Table 9), this negative e¤ect
of the males IR index disappears if we condition on wages, non-labour incomes and land incomes
and, therefore, it may be regarded as mainly capturing an income e¤ect. Overall, these results
suggest that our measures of instability are able to capture the gains to divorce, and that women
in Malawi are more likely to divorce for economic reasons than men. These results validate our
structural model.
Other covariates are also signicantly related to divorce. The probability of divorce is decreasing
in the number of children, with an additional child reducing divorce probability by 1:4 percentage
points. This implies that an approximately 2:3 percentage point reduction in the wifes maximum
gain from remarriage, as a percentage of income, reduces divorce probability as much as an addi-
tional child. The probability of divorce is falling in the age of the household head, which may be
because couples who are together longer are better matched, or because the value of outside options
on the marriage market falls with age. We also nd that divorce probability is decreasing in the
households wealth, as captured by the per capita consumption quintile. This is consistent with
the descriptive statistics in Section 4. In villages with many mosques, divorce is less likely, while
divorce is more likely in villages with a telephone, again suggesting that connectedness plays an
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Table 7: A logit model of marital instability and divorce
(1) Maximum BPs (2) Average BPs
Divorced in 2013
BP (woman) 0.006 0.179
(0.002) (0.049)
BP (man) 0.004 0.016
(0.005) (0.007)
IR (man) -0.002 -0.006
(0.004) (0.004)
# Children -0.014 -0.015
(0.006) (0.006)
Age of head -0.002 -0.002
(0.001) (0.001)
2nd Quintile -0.098 -0.099
(0.030) (0.030)
3rd Quintile -0.064 -0.066
(0.027) (0.027)
4th Quintile -0.069 -0.073
(0.031) (0.031)
5th Quintile -0.039 -0.046
(0.037) (0.036)
# Churches 0.001 -0.000
(0.002) (0.002)
# Mosques -0.011 -0.011
(0.005) (0.005)
Access to phone 0.044 0.051
(0.025) (0.023)
Size of cluster 0.000 0.001
(0.001) (0.001)
Number of observations 1404 1404
This table reports the results of a logit model, with marginal e¤ects evalu-
ated at the means of the covariates. Both regressions also include the age,
education and religion di¤erence of the spouses, the education level of the
household head, the HH distance to the nearest road and urban centre and
district xed e¤ects. * indicates signicance at the 10% level, ** at the 5%
level and *** at the 1% level.
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important role in household dissolution. Finally, the size of the cluster is not signicantly related
to divorce.
It is worth noting that the absence of domestic labour cannot explain the signicant e¤ect of the
wifes instability index on divorce. As domestic labour is currently included in leisure, marriages
appear to be more attractive than they actually are. Consider a woman who engages in a lot of
domestic labour: she appears to be stable, but at the same time is unhappy because she works hard,
as a result of which she is more likely to divorce. An increase in domestic labour increases stability
in our model but at the same time is likely to increase the probability of divorce. Therefore, it
cannot explain the positive relationship between the instability indices and divorce probability.
Finally, our results cannot be explained by polygamy. The inclusion of a dummy for the existence
of polygamy in the village does not a¤ect the signicant e¤ect of the wifes instability index on
divorce, but we do nd that the existence of polygamy increases the overall probability of divorce
(results available on request).
5.3 Extensions
Multinomial model An important implication of the way that the instability indices are dened
is that the BP index measures the attractiveness of a potential new match on the marriage market,
while the IR index measures the attractiveness of being single. Therefore, we should observe these
associations in the data as well. In order to explore this, we estimate a multinomial logit model
for the marital status of husbands and wives in 2013, distinguishing between remarriage and being
single.9 We retain the same right-hand side variables as in Table 7 and set remaining married
as the base case. The results are in Table 8, which reports relative risk ratios (exponentiated
coe¢ cients).10
The results are consistent with the premise that the BP indices measure the attractiveness of
remarriage. In particular, a higher value of the husbands BP index is signicantly associated with
a higher probability that the husband divorces and remarries in the next three years, instead of
remaining married. The e¤ect of the wifes BP index is stronger and is signicantly associated with
the remarriage of both the husband and the wife. This result is consistent with the observation that
in Malawi, men nd it easy to remarry. A one percentage point increase in the wifes maximum
remarriage gain, as a proportion of household income, raises the relative risk of both the husband
and wife divorcing and remarrying, relative to remaining married, by a factor of 1:1. Neither the
wifes nor the husbands BP index raises the odds of divorcing and being single, relative to staying
married; this is encouraging, as blocking pairs relate specically to potential remarriage partners
and should not be related to individuals divorcing in order to be single. Therefore, the BP indices
9The multinomial logit model assumes Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA). A more general model is the
nested logit, which allows for correlation between alternatives. We estimated a nested logit model for marital status
with a reduced set of district dummy variables, as the model did not converge with the full set. In this restricted
version of the nested logit model, the IIA assumption was not rejected. Therefore, we proceeded with the multinomial
logit model.
10The sample size in these estimates is lower than in the previous table because we do not know the marital status
of every divorced man and woman (see also the explanation in Section 3.2).
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Table 8: Multinomial logit regressions on marital status
(1) - Marital status of man (2) - Marital status of woman
Remarried Single Remarried Single
BPmax (woman) 1.134 0.968 1.088 1.033
(0.036) (0.062) (0.039) (0.039)
BPmax (man) 1.160 1.004 0.927 1.025
(0.091) (0.168) (0.116) (0.065)
IR (man) 0.944 1.023 0.945 1.068
(0.064) (0.115) (0.058) (0.057)
# Children 0.961 0.628 0.804 0.855
(0.090) (0.063) (0.072) (0.096)
Age of head 0.970 0.995 0.967 0.978
(0.016) (0.022) (0.015) (0.014)
2nd Quintile 0.451 0.074 0.325 0.323
(0.221) (0.094) (0.144) (0.178)
3rd Quintile 0.586 0.182 0.324 0.650
(0.273) (0.145) (0.142) (0.290)
4th Quintile 0.466 0.295 0.503 0.198
(0.257) (0.217) (0.209) (0.105)
5th Quintile 1.498 0.011 0.313 0.494
(0.770) (0.018) (0.190) (0.312)
# Churches 1.001 0.964 0.990 1.033
(0.022) (0.046) (0.031) (0.036)
# Mosques 0.830 0.857 0.949 0.883
(0.059) (0.094) (0.062) 0.061
Access to phone 1.908 0.470 2.050 1.505
(0.716) (0.368) (0.616) (0.591)
Size of cluster 1.005 0.989 1.003 1.024
(0.009) (0.026) (0.010) 0.014
Number of observations 1345 1378
This table reports relative risk ratios (standard error) from a multinomial logit model. All regressions
also include the age, education and religion di¤erence of the spouses, the education level of the
household head, the HH distance to the nearest road and urban centre and district xed e¤ects.
District FEs for regression (2) are an aggregated version of those for regression (1), due to insu¢ cient
variation in the outcome in some districts. * indicates signicance at the 10% level, ** at the 5%
level and *** at the 1% level.
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appear to capture the attractiveness of remarriage in particular. The husbands IR index does not
a¤ect the odds of either divorce status, relative to remaining married. This may be because the
values of the IR indices are very low in general, with little variation; because few men are observed
to be single in the data; or because there are unobserved benets to being married.
Other signicant e¤ects persist from Table 7: the odds of a woman divorcing and remarrying are
declining in the number of children, as are the odds that a man divorces and remains single. The
number of mosques has a signicant negative e¤ect on the odds that the man divorces and remarries,
as well as the odds that the woman divorces and remains single. The presence of a telephone in the
village increases the odds of remarriage for both the husband and wife but, interestingly, has no
e¤ect on the odds that either spouse is single. This supports the idea that the telephone captures
some of the ability of spouses to learn about their marriage market. Finally, a higher consumption
quintile of the household is broadly associated with lower odds of divorce for the wife, consistent
with the results in Table 7, which showed that wealthier households are less likely to divorce.
Can the e¤ect of instability be explained by wages or income? The results so far suggest
that individuals, and particularly women, in Malawi divorce for economic reasons and that our
instability indices capture these economic reasons well. However, one might argue that the BP
index does not capture the economic gains from divorce, but rather is entirely driven by one or
more of its components from equation (8) in Section 2.3. In order to explore this possibility, we
introduce these components as explanatory variables to regressions (1) and (2) in Table 7. In
particular, we include the average wage of the husband and wife, the di¤erence between these
wages, the average non-labour income of the spouses, its di¤erence, as well as the average land
income, its di¤erence, and the log of total income. All of these variables are the product of the
estimation discussed in Section 2.4. The results are in Table 9.
The key result is that the coe¢ cients on the BP indices in this table are not signicantly
di¤erent from those in the regressions in Table 7. In other words, the e¤ect of our instability
index cannot be explained simply by di¤erences in wages, non-labour income or land income of
the spouses. These variables do seem to explain the negative impact of the IR index of the man,
however, indicating that this index is mainly capturing an income e¤ect. As such we can conclude
that the BP indices are able to capture a more complex form of gains from divorce that likely
includes intrahousehold sharing of consumption, which is an important determinant of the BP
indices in the model. Finally, we nd that the average wage and the non-labour income of the
household have a signicant decreasing e¤ect on the probability of divorce, beyond any indirect
e¤ect through the BP indices. Presumably, this is because they increase the gains to the current
marriage. The same conclusion does not hold for land income and total income, but note that the
impact of these variables is rather small compared to all the other variables.
Heterogeneous e¤ects We have shown that spousesBP indices are signicantly associated
with divorce, that this result holds in a multinomial model and that it cannot be explained by the
components of the BP indices from the structural model. This relationship may mask signicant
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Table 9: Explaining the e¤ect of instability with its individual components
(1) Maximum BPs (2) Average BPs
Divorced in 2013
BP (woman) 0.006 0.161
(0.002) (0.048)
BP (man) 0.002 0.013
(0.005) (0.007)
IR (man) 0.001 -0.004
(0.004) (0.004)
Wage (avg.) -0.005 -0.006
(0.002) (0.002)
Wage (di¤.) -0.001 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001)
NLI (avg., 000s) -0.001 -0.001
(0.000) (0.000)
NLI (di¤., 000s) 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
Land income (avg., 000s) -0.002 -0.002
(0.001) (0.001)
Land income (di¤., 000s) 0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.001)
Log(total income) 0.539 0.574
(0.225) (0.223)
Number of observations 1404 1404
This table reports the results of a logit regression, with marginal e¤ects eval-
uated at the means of the covariates. Both models also include the same
right-hand side variables as in Table 7. * indicates signicance at the 10%
level, ** at the 5% level and *** at the 1% level.
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heterogeneity, and this is what we explore here. We focus on the most attractive remarriage
possibility (BPmax ) and we include some new variables in the logit model of Table 7, such as
landholdings and the sex ratio (dened as the ratio of males over females in a given cluster), as
well as explore heterogeneity in existing explanatory variables, namely age of the household head
and number of children. Table 10 shows these results.
In regression (1), we nd that the signicant e¤ect of BPmax on divorce only holds when the
household has positive landholdings, and is increasing in these landholdings. For a household that
owns two acres of land, which are the average landholdings in our sample, an increase in the wifes
BPmax of one percentage point increases the probability of divorce by 0:6 percentage points, which
is comparable to the e¤ect in Table 7. The result also makes intuitive sense: land provides security
on divorce, so spouses without land may nd it too economically risky to divorce.
Next, we consider the interaction between age and the BPmax indices. Regression (2) shows
that the wifes BPmax index is still a signicant predictor of divorce, but this e¤ect is declining in
the age of the household head. This may be for two reasons: rst, age may be a proxy for marital
duration, and assuming match quality is revealed over time, spouses may be less driven by economic
incentives later on in marriage. Second, age may tell us something about the individuals outside
options. An older divorcée may have lower chances on the remarriage market than a younger
divorcée, all other things equal, so that she may be less likely to respond to attractive outside
options.
In the baseline regressions in Table 7, children always reduce the probability of divorce. In
regression (3), we nd that this is especially true for men: high remarriage gains for the husband are
less likely to result in divorce if the couple has more children. This is also true for the wife, although
the e¤ect is not statistically signicant. Finally, in regression (4) we examine the interaction
between the sex ratio and the e¤ect of blocking pairs on divorce. For a sex ratio equal to one,
an increase in the wifes BPmax index of one percentage point increases the probability of divorce
by approximately 1:6 percentage points. The more men there are, relative to women, the stronger
the e¤ect of the wifes potential gains from remarriage on divorce probability. This is a rational
response: if there are more men relative to women in the population, the likelihood of a protable
remarriage is greater.
6 Conclusion
We have dened structural measures of the gains from divorce and shown that they are signicant
predictors of future divorces. These measures are based on a collective model with consumption
and agricultural production embedded in a marriage market. The key theoretical contribution
is that we extend Cherchye, Demuynck, De Rock and Vermeulen (2015) to include agricultural
production, allowing the estimation of shadow wages and land prices. The model yields marital
stability conditions for each married individual. Using these conditions, we can quantify marital
instability in terms of Individual Rationality (IR) and Blocking Pair (BP) indices, which capture
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Table 10: Heterogeneous e¤ects of blocking pairs
(1) (2)
Divorced in 2013 Divorced in 2013
BPmax (woman) 0.001 BPmax (woman) 0.018
(0.003) (0.007)
Land*BPmax (woman) 0.003 Age*BPmax (woman) -0.0003
(0.001) (0.000)
BPmax (man) 0.007 BPmax (man) 0.024
(0.008) (0.019)
Land*BPmax (man) -0.003 Age*BPmax (man) -0.001
(0.003) (0.001)
Land Age -0.001
(0.011) (0.001)
Number of observations 1404 Number of observations 1404
(3) (4)
Divorced in 2013 Divorced in 2013
BPmax (woman) 0.011 BPmax (female) -0.040
(0.004) (0.015)
Children*BPmax (woman) -0.002 Sex ratio*BPmax (female) 0.056
(0.001) (0.018)
BPmax (man) 0.018 BPmax (man) 0.019
(0.009) (0.020)
Children*NBPmax (man) -0.007 Sex ratio*BPmax (man) -0.015
(0.003) (0.022)
Children -0.008 Sex ratio -0.225
(0.008) (0.154)
Number of observations 1404 Number of observations 1404
This table reports the results of a logit model, with marginal e¤ects evaluated at the means of the covariates. All
regressions in this table include the same right-hand side variables as in Table 7. * indicates signicance at the
10% level, ** at the 5% level and *** at the 1% level.
29
spouses consumption gains to remarrying another individual in the same marriage market (BP
index) and to being single (IR index).
We estimate our model on the 2010 wave of the Malawi Integrated Household Survey, and
correlate our instability indices with divorce in the next three years of the panel data set. We nd
that a 1 percentage point increase in the wifes BP index as a proportion of her household income
increases divorce probability by 0:6 percentage points in the next three years. This result is robust
to using an average BP or most attractive BP index, as well as to the estimation of a more general
multinomial model. We also show that this result cannot be explained by the wages or land income
of the spouses, implying that intrahousehold sharing matters.
Our ndings lead us to conclude that divorce in Malawi is driven, at least partly, by economic
considerations of spouses, with consumption sharing within households as an important deter-
minant. In addition, our empirical results validate the set-up of our theoretical model. More
generally, they show the value-added of adopting a Beckerian approach that analyzes marriage de-
cisions through the lens of a structural model of household decision making. Finally, as agricultural
productivity is a key determinant of outside options in developing countries reliant on agriculture,
our model is applicable to other contexts as well, where accurate data on wages or land prices may
not be available.
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Appendix: data construction
All values used in our empirical application were converted to real terms using the spatial and
temporal price index provided in the IHS. In some cases we recoded outliers, namely the top 1%
of values, to be equal to the value at the 99th percentile. This was because in those cases the top
1% of values were not sensible, given the context of the data.
Bounds on wages and land prices
Wages We calculated the median observed wage per hour of hired workers in the district,
separately for males and females. Where there were insu¢ cient observations, we used the regional
median instead. The bounds were zero and two times this median.
Land price per acre For each plot of owned land, households were asked how much they
could earn if they rented it out for one year. We regressed this value on plot characteristics: the
size of the plot; the soil type of the plot; the soil quality of the plot; whether the plot is swamp
or wetland; and how the household acquired the plot. We then used the predicted values of this
regression to estimate the rental income for those plots where the reported rental income was
missing. The rental income was summed for each household and divided by the total acres of land,
giving an average rental income per acre for each household. We then obtained the median rental
income per acre for each village and for each district. We used the median rental income per acre
for the village where there were at least seven observations per village; where there were fewer, we
used the median rental income per acre for the district. The bounds on the land price were zero
and two times this median.
Production
Inputs We calculated the cost of inputs into production as the total of direct inputs, such
as the costs of fertilizer, seeds and transport, the cost of indirect inputs, namely machinery, and the
cost of hired labour. For machinery, we calculated the use value of each item by rst calculating the
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remaining age of the item as twice the mean age of this item in the sample minus its current age,
with a minimum of two years. The annual consumption stream from each item was the amount of
money the item could be sold for, if sold today, divided by the remaining age of the item. The cost
of hired labour was calculated as the number of days this labour was used times the average daily
wage for these labourers, as reported by the household. The survey distinguished between male,
female and child labourers, providing a more accurate measure of the total cost. Free labour was
also valued at these rates and included as a costly input.
Revenue The revenue was calculated as the sum of all crop sales during the rainy and dry
seasons and the value of all own agricultural production that was consumed by the household.
The latter value originates from the survey itself, where households were asked how much of each
consumed food they had grown themselves. This was then valued at local prices by the World Bank
Living Standards Measurement Study team.11
Consumption
Consumption was split into four categories: public consumption; private non-assignable consump-
tion; private consumption of the man and private consumption of the woman.
Public consumption This included expenditure on childrens education and health, expendi-
ture on the education and health of other household members (not the husband or wife), expenditure
on childrens clothing, expenditure on durables (which was calculated as a use value or consumption
stream, using the same method described for machinery above), expenditure on public nondurables
(such as candles, light bulbs and books), expenditure on rent and expenditure on public bills (such
as rewood and the landline telephone).
Private non-assignable consumption The largest component of private non-assignable con-
sumption was food, consisting of food purchased, the value of food from own production and the
value of food received as a gift. This category also included private bills (such as the mobile tele-
phone) and private nondurables (such as cigarettes, tickets for public transport, soap and stationery
items).
Private consumption of the man and woman This consisted of the health, education and
clothing expenses of the man or woman.
Time
The model requires two time variables: agricultural labour and leisure.
11Many thanks to Talip Kilic for sharing his Stata code that allowed us to separately identify consumption from
own production and consumption from purchases.
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Agricultural labour Agricultural labour was calculated as the total number of hours of agri-
cultural work on the households plots in the rainy and dry seasons of the past year, reported by
the husband or wife. Where certain information was missing, such as the individual reported the
number of days worked but not the number of hours per day, we used the village median for this
information, where there were at least seven observations in the village. Otherwise, we used the
district median.
Leisure In order to calculate leisure hours, we rst required a measure of total available hours.
As reported working hours are fairly low, leading to likely overestimates of true leisure time, we
calculated total time available as the number of hours worked by the hardest working man or woman
in the sample in the past year. This included both agricultural and wage labour and resulted in
a value of 6120 hours. We assumed that this hardest worker works full-time and has zero leisure.
We then calculated leisure for each individual as 6120 minus the annual hours of agricultural and
wage labour of each individual.
Landholdings
In order to accurately measure the land income of individuals on divorce, we required exact in-
formation on the amount of land owned by each spouse. We dened land to be owned if it was
inherited, granted by local leaders, part of a bride price, purchased with a title or purchased with-
out a title. Land that was owned either solely by the spouse or owned by the spouse jointly with
someone outside the household was assumed to accrue to that spouse on divorce. Land not owned
by either spouse was assumed to disappear after divorce, while land owned jointly by the spouses
was allowed to be endogenously split in the simulations.
Covariates in regressions
Here we explain how the covariates in the regressions were dened. All covariates from the data
are from the 2010 wave. The 2013 wave was only used to see whether the couple had divorced.
# Children This is the number of own or adopted children living in the household.
Consumption quintiles This splits the entire sample into ve sections, in terms of per capita
consumption. The rst quintile is a dummy variable that equals one if the household is in the
bottom 20% of per capita consumption in the full IHS sample and zero otherwise, while the fth
quintile is a similar denition for households in the top 20%. Other quintiles are dened analogously.
Age of head This is the age of the household head; the identity of the head was self-reported in
the data.
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Head education level This is a series of dummy variables that dene the highest education
level of the head, which ranges from no education to tertiary education.
Diploma di¤erence This is the husbands highest achieved diploma minus the wifes highest
achieved diploma. The highest achieved diploma ranges from 1 (none) to a 7 (post-graduate
degree). The di¤erence ranges from -3 to 6 in our sample.
Age di¤erence This is the husbands age minus the wifes age.
Religion di¤erence This is a dummy variable that equals one if the spouses are of a di¤erent
religious denomination, and zero otherwise.
# Churches/ #Mosques This is the number of churches/mosques in the village, as reported
by village informants.
Distance to road, urban centre This is the households distance to the nearest road or nearest
urban centre (Lilongwe, Zomba or Blantyre) in kilometers.
Access to phone This is a dummy variable that equals one if there is a place in the village to
make a phonecall, and zero otherwise.
Sex ratio This is the ratio of men to women at the cluster level in the IHS sample, calculated
based on the heads of household. Single-headed households count as one male or one female, while
married households count as one male and one female.
Land This is the total number of acres of land owned by the household.
Size of cluster This is the total number of households in that particular households marriage
market cluster, dened using the method described in Section 3.2.
Public/private share of consumption This is the share of public or private consumption in
total consumption.
Nonlabour income (NLI) This is an output of the structural model and is the di¤erence
between total consumption and other inputs on the one hand and labour and land income on the
other hand .
Land income This is an output of the structural model and gives the total number of acres of
land owned by the spouse multiplied by the shadow price of land. It measures the annual rental
yield on the land.
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Wage This is an output of the structural model and gives the hourly shadow wage of agricultural
labour of the husband or wife.
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